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19 ILLIATOIS LAW REVIEW
years of labor, and giving it to the relatives of the wife, who were
strangers to the husband. And in Elliott v. Prater," the court
lays stress upon the two considerations, (1) the admissions by the
wife of ownership in the husband and (2) the fact that this prop-
erty constituted the bulk of the husband's estate, and gives scant
weight to the consideration of dominion exercised by the husband
over the property.
In the principal case now under comment.12 The sole con-
sideration was that the effect of the presumption of gift would be
to transfer to the children by the second wife the whole of the
accumulation of the husband's earnings, to the deprivation of the
children of the first wife, a result which the court termed an in-
equitable one.
From these cases must it not be the conclusion that first and
last the consideration that will prove the prevailing one in the mind
of the court is that of the natural equity between the parties, the
court bearing in mind the common pressure to which the wife often,
and properly, subjects the husband to have the title to the property
placed in her name? So that when the relationship of the parties
is terminated by death, the direction the property will take, whether
along the line of the wife or that of the husband, will depend upon
the equities of their respective heirs and not upon the seat of the
legal title. ELMER M. LEESMAN.
OTHER JURISDICTIONS
CONFLICT OF LAWS-LAW GOVERNING THE PERFORMANCE OF
A CONTRACT-VALIDITY OF POWER OF ATTORNEY TO CONFESS
JUDGMENT.-[Indiana] A suit was brought in Indiana upon an
Illinois judgment rendered upon a promissory note payable in Illi-
nois, but executed by the maker in Indiana, and containing an
irrevocable power of attorney to confess judgment. The power
was valid under the law of Illinois, and invalid under the law of
Indiana. The judgment was by confession 'under the power. It
was held that the judgment was void for lack of jurisdiction and
unenforceable in Indiana.-
This case reverses the prior decision of the Appellate Court of
Indiana in the same case.2 It is submitted that the first decision is
the correct one. It went upon the ground that, because the note
was payable in Illinois, the parties intended the transaction to be
governed by the law of that state; and, being valid there, the judg-
ment bound the Indiana courts under the full faith and credit clause
of the United States Constitution. The case was transferred to the
Supreme Court of Indiana.3 The reasoning of the Supreme Court
11. 269 Ill. 69.
12. Reid v. Reid supra.
1. Egley v. T. B. Bennett & Co. (1924) 144 N. E. 533; (1925) 145 N. E.830.
2. 139 N. E. 385.3. Under Section 1394, Burns' Ann. Stat., Ind., 1914.
COMMENT ON RECENT CASES
is as follows: (1) The note was an Indiana contract; (2) it was
invalid as "undertaking to oust the courts of jurisdiction"; (3) the
power to confess judgment was invalid under Indiana law; (4) the
Illinois court never acquired jurisdiction of the defendant and the
Indiana court was not bound to give effect to its judgment.
To sustain its first proposition the court cites two cases:
Equitable Life, etc., Soc. v. Perkins4 and Swing v. Marion Pulp
Co.5 The latter case merely holds that a contract of insurance is
complete when mailed by the company. The first case holds that
an insurance contract mailed in New York to the insured in Ken-
tucky is a New York contract (the premiums were payable in New
York). There was nothing to take the contract out of the general
rule as to the law governing a contract right, both as to the place
of execution and performance. The cases, therefore, support the
proposition made by the court, but it is clear that they do not con-
travene the well established rule that the validity of a contract is
governed by the law of the state of performance, especially where
the provisions as to performance are valid in that state and invalid
in the state where the contract is executed. Upon this point the
court says nothing, but in effect the decision is inconsistent'with this
well established principle.
As supporting its second proposition the court cites several
Indiana cases which hold invalid a provision of a building or insur-
ance contract which makes conclusive an architect's or arbitrator's
award. But the reason given is that such a contract "ousts the
courts of jurisdiction." The contract in question, however, does
not attempt to oust the courts of jurisdiction, but rather attempts
to confer jurisdiction upon them. There would certainly seem to
be no objection to a citizen of Indiana appointing an agent in Illi-
nois to do an act which the law of Illinois sanctions. Had the de-
fendant executed the note in Illinois the judgment would have been
valid; had he employed an Illinois attorney to act for him in con-
fessing judgment in Illinois the judgment would have been valid.
It seems, therefore, no proper concern of the state of Indiana that
the preliminary step was taken in Indiana. The appointment was
contingent upon an event to happen in Illinois and the act authorized
was to be performed in Illinois.
The court cites the case of Old Wa.ne Life Assn. v. McDon-
ough6 to sustain its result. That case involved the validity of service
of summons upon a state insurance commissioner in a suit against
a foreign corporation which had never done business in the state.
The court held the service invalid. The case does not help any in
the determination of the question as to whether or not an attempted
voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of another state by an in-
dividual is valid.
As supporting its third proposition the court argues that the
power to confess judgment is not authorized by statute or by the
4. (1907) 41 Ind. App. 183, 80 N. E. 682.
5. (1910) 47 Ind. App. 199, 93 N. E. 1004.
6. (1906) 204 U. S. 8, 27 Sup. Ct. 236, 51 L. Ed. 345.
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common law and is contrary to public policy, and therefore void.
If the Indiana court refuses to recognize the power for the reason
that there is no authority in the statute law or common law for its
use, then whether or not it is contrary to public policy is imma-
terial. The first two propositions are admittedly the law of In-
diana. But to sustain the third premise the court cites the Indiana
statute7 and says :8
"So far from such contracts being made legal or the recovery ofjudgment thereon by confession being authorized by any statute of
Indiana, the statutes to which we have referred (sections 615, 1004,
supra) expressly forbid such action as was taken in the Circuit Court
of Livingston County, Illinois, in the case at bar."
Section 615 expressly provides for confession of judgment by
power of attorney where the party at the time he executes thepower makes an affidavit that the debt is just and owing and that
such confession is not made for the purpose of defrauding his
creditors. Section 1004 is ambiguous, providing that, "No judg-
ment shall be rendered against any party upon the agreement of an
attorney, nor any judgment by default, where the party has not
been notified, or personally entered his appearance, unless the
written authority of the party be first produced and its execution
proved to the satisfaction of the court." At its worst this section
certainly sanctions action similar to that complained of in the prin-
cipal case.
In addition to the above statutes the court cites two Indiana
cases as sustaining its position as to public policy, Irose v. Balla9
and Garrigue v. Kellar."0 The first case involved an Illinois judg-
ment by confession on a power of attorney contained in a promis-
sory note executed and payable in Indiana. The substance of the
court's decision in that case is that the judgment was not enforce-
able in Indiana for the reason that the power of attorney was not
supported by the affidavit required by Section 615, supra; that the
contract was wholly an Indiana contract and consequently invalid;
that the power of attorney could not be construed to permit a con-
fession of judgment in Illinois. The second case holds that a
promissory note executed by a married woman in Illinois and pay-
able in Indiana is governed by the law of Illinois as to the capacity
of the married woman to contract as surety, and that, though the
Indiana law would have forbidden a recovery had the note been
executed in Indiana, there was nothing in the public policy of the
state to forbid recovery on an admittedly valid right acquired in a
foreign state. It is apparent that neither case strengthens the
court's argument, and that in fact the Garrique case defeats it, both
on the question as to the law governing the performance of con-
tracts, and as to the question of public policy.
7. (1914) Burns' Ann. Stat. secs. 615 and 1004.
8. P. 535.
9. (1913) 181 Ind. 491, 104 N. E. 851.
10. (1905) 164 Ind. 676, 74 N. E. 523, 69 L. R. A. 870, 108 A. S. R. 324.
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It is submitted that in view of the able and correct decision of
the Appellate Court that the Suprenme Court has gone out of its
way to contravene several well settled principles of law in an attempt
to afford police profection to unwary citizens of Indiana, and that
the decision would not be upheld by the Supreme Court of the
United States.
BERNARD C. GAVIT.
EQUITY-INJUNCTION IN SUIT FOR ALIENATION OF AFFECTION.
-[Ohio] In Snwdaker v. King,' the Supreme Court of Ohio was
called upon to decide whether it is a proper exercise of equity
jurisdiction perpetually to enjoin an insolvent defendant, who is
engaged in alienating the affection of the plaintiff's husband, from
"visiting or associating" with him, "going to or near him,
writing or speaking to him, or in any manner, either directly or
indirectly, communicating with him by word, letter, writing, sign or
symbol." By a vote of four to two, it was held that the injunction
should have been denied. "The opening of such a wide field for
injunctive process," we read in the opinion per curiam, "enforce-
able only by contempt proceedings, the difficulty if not impossibility
of such enforcement, and the very doubtful beneficial results to be
obtained thereby, warrant the denial of such a decree."
The case is of interest, not only because of the novelty of the
issue involved, but because Allen, J., not only voted with the ma-
jority but wrote a concurring opinion setting forth her reasons for
so doing. She thought that the injunction would be unenforceable
unless a probation officer were attached permanently to both the
husband and the defendant; that it was too broad in scope, since
for the defendant to say "good morning" to the plaintiff's husband
would be to communicate with him; that it would merely add fuel
to the flame, and "from the perversity of human nature" would
"almost inevitably make wrongdoing even more alluring"; that a
money judgment, even though in a nominal sum or uncollectable,
since it brands the defendant is the plaintiff's most adequate remedy.
No authority is cited, either in the per curiam opinion or in
that of Allen, J. In the dissenting opinions of Marshall, C. J., and
Day. J., ex parte Warfield2 and Stark v. Hamilton3 are considered.
The former was a habeas corpus proceeding to release Warfield,
who had been committed to jail for violation of an order almost
identical in terms with that iff the case before us. The only ques-
tion before the court was that of jurisdiction, in the strict sense
of the term, and it was held that the order was not a nullity, and
that consequently Warfield was not entitled to be released. But
the opinion leaves the impression that the court felt that the order
was not only within the power of a chancellor but was a proper
exercise of that power. In Stark v. Hamilton,4 where a temporary
1. (1924) 145 N. E. 15.
2. (1899) 40 Tex. Cr. 413, 50 S. W. 933, 76 Am. St. Rep. 724.
3. (1919) 149 Ga. 227, 99 S. E. 861, 5 A. L. R. 1041.
4. Supra, note 3.
